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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal brought by Jadwiga Melton (hereinafter "Jadwiga") the personal 
representative of the Estates of Robert Ernest Melton and Hedwig "Hedy" Melton, the 
Appellant, in which Jadwiga challenges the District Judge's decision reversing the 
Magistrate Judge's holding that Heinz Alt (hereinafter "Heinz"), the Respondent, failed 
to bring a claim against the estate of his mother, Hedwig "Hedy" Melton (hereinafter 
"Hedy"), within three years of her death, summary judgment was appropriate as 
Heinz's claim against Hedy's estate was barred by the statute of limitations. 
Factual History 
Heinz is the biological son of Hedy and the stepson of her deceased husband, Robert 
Ernest Melton (hereinafter "Robert"). (R. 229). Heinz alleges that he loaned money to his 
mother and step-father to enable them to purchase land and build a log home in Boundary 
County. (R. 230). Hedy and Robert first obtained title to the land on April 11, 1996. (R. 73). 
On July 29, 1998, Hedy and Robert each executed a Last Will and Testament. On July 10, 1999, 
the land was deeded to Heinz. (R. 74). Heinz alleges that the property was deeded to him as 
security for the money he loaned to his mother and step-father. (R. 230). Subsequently, 




{MWCOOI 78754.DOCX; 1/20397.100} 
Hedy died on August 11, 2008. (R. 230). At the time of her death, Hedy had a will 
directing that all of her property would pass to Robert, and, in the event Robert preceded Hedy in 
death, then all of her property would pass to Heinz. (R. 26). Hedy's will was never probated. 
(R. 230). 
Prior to December 2010, Robert's will mirrored Hedy's will and provided that ifhe 
preceded Hedy in death, all of Robert's property would pass to her, and, if Hedy preceded him in 
death, all of Robert's property would pass to Heinz. (R. 30). In 2010, Robert married 
Jadwiga. (R. 230). Robert executed a new will in December of 2010 after marrying 
Jadwiga. (R. 230). Robert died on July 4, 2013. (R. 230). At the time of his death, 
Robert's will directed that all of his property would pass to Jadwiga. (R. 12). The only 
assets of the estate are the land and home located in Bonners Ferry, Idaho. Heinz 
maintains that Hedy and Robert purchased the land and constructed the home with 
money he loaned to them. (R. 21-22). 
Procedural History 
On August 29, 2013, Jadwiga filed a Petition for Summary Administration of 
Robert's estate pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-1205. (R. 10). On August 30, 2013, a Decree 
Vesting Estate in Surviving Spouse was entered. (R. 19). 
On September 6, 2013, Heinz filed a Motion to Convert Proceedings to Supervised 
Administration and to Determine Testacy based on his claim that he is entitled to repayment 
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of the money he loaned Hedy and Robert to purchase the land and construct the home at 
issue. (R 21-23). On October 21, 2013, an Order Setting Aside the Decree Vesting Estate 
in Surviving Spouse was entered. (R. 39). 
On December 9, 2014, Jadwiga filed a Petition for Formal Probate of Will and 
Formal Appointment of Personal Representative. (R. 41). Because Hedy's will was never 
probated, Jadwiga requested that the estates of both Hedy and Robert be joined for probate 
in one proceeding. (R. 41-44). This was done pursuant to LC.§ 15-3-111. 
On January 13, 2015, Heinz filed a claim for $102,574.50 against the estate based on LC. 
§ 15-3-804. (R. 4 7). Heinz submitted several unauthenticated documents to support his claim. 
(R. 50-54). On February 2, 2015, Jadwiga was appointed the personal representative of the 
estates of Robert and Hedy. (R. 55). On February 9, 2015, Jadwiga filed a Notice to 
Creditors with the Court. (R. 5). The notice was first published in the Bonners Ferry 
Herald on February 19, 2015. (R. 58). On March 13, 2015, Jadwiga mailed a Notice of 
Disallowance of Claim to Heinz's attorney. (R. 80). The Notice of Disallowance was filed 
with the Court on March 17, 2015. (R. 58). Heinz was informed that his claim was being 
disallowed for the following reasons: (1) the claim was untimely because Heinz failed to 
bring it within three years of Hedy's death, (2) Heinz failed to provide documentation that 




had not been authenticated. (R. 148-149). On May 4, 2015, Heinz filed a Petition to Allow 
Claims. (R. 59). 
On June 29, 2015, Jadwiga filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to Deny Creditor 
Claim. (R. 69-70). A hearing was held on August 24, 2015. (R. 150-55). On October 8, 
2015, Magistrate Judge Justin W. Julian issued his Memorandum Opinion granting 
Jadwiga's Motion for Summary Judgment in part. (R. 198-205). Specifically, Judge Julian 
concluded that Jadwiga's disallowance of Heinz's creditor claim was timely, and that Heinz's 
claim against Hedy's estate is barred by LC. § 15-3-803 because Heinz failed to bring his 
claim within three years of Hedy's death. (R. 201-04). The Magistrate Judge expressly 
stated that "Heinz may still proceed with his claim against Robert's estate." (R. 204). On 
December 3, 2015, the Magistrate Judge entered a Judgment on the above two issues and 
certified it as a final judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 54(b). (R. 206). On February 27, 2017 
a Second Amended Judgment was entered. (R. 434). 
On January 13, 2016, Heinz filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. 208). An Amended Notice of 
Appeal was filed by Heinz on March 2, 2016. (R. 216). Oral argument was heard on October 7, 
2016. (R. 315-16). The District Court affirmed the disallowance of Heinz's creditor claim was 
timely and reversed the Magistrate Court's determination that Heinz's claim against Hedy's 
estate is barred by LC. § 15-3-803 because Heinz failed to bring his claim within three years 




II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Whether the District Court erred as a matter of law by reversing the Magistrate Court's decision 
that Heinz Alt's claim against the Estate of Hedwig "Hedy" Melton is barred by Idaho Code§ 
15-3-803? 
A. The District Court erred as a matter of law by construing the statutory language of LC. § 
15-3-111 against its plain and ordinary meaning. 
B. The District Court erred by not considering legislative intent before construing LC. § 15-
3-111 and in the event a legislative history analysis is proper, the legislative history of 
LC. § 15-3-111 does not indicate a legislative intent to extend the creditor claim 
limitation period. 
C. The District Court improperly applied rules of statutory construction in construing LC. § 
15-3-111. 
1. The District Court erred by allowing words to be added to LC. § 15-3-111. 
2. Marshall v. Department of Transportation and the statutory rule favoring specific 
statutes over general statutes was misapplied to the facts of this matter. 
3. Enforcing the statutory creditor claim period in the context of joint probate does 
not produce an absurd result. 
4. A strict three (3) year creditor claim period in the context of a joint probate does 




5. Enforcing the creditor claim limitation period in the context of joint probate does 
not produce an absurd result, because a creditor can and must timely assert their 
claim. 
D. Jadwiga is entitled to her costs and attorney's fees pursuant to I.R.C.P. §§ 54(d)-(e)(2) 
and LC. 15-8-208. 
III. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
"When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the Supreme Court applies the same 
standard of review that was used by the trial court in ruling on the motion for summary 
judgment." In re Estate of Ortega, 153 Idaho 609,612, 288 P.3d 826, 829 (2012) (quoting 
Vreeken v. Lockwood Engineering, B. V, 148 Idaho 89,101,218 P.3d 1150, 1162 (2009)). 
Summary judgment is proper, "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). 
The Supreme Court freely reviews the interpretation of a statute and its application to the 
facts. State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471,474, 163 P.3d 1183, 1186 (2007). The primary 
function of the court is to determine and give effect to the legislative intent and such intent 
should be derived from a reading of the whole act at issue. George W Watkins Family v. 
Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 539-40, 797 P.2d 1385, 1387-88 (1990). When a statute is 
ambiguous, the determination of the meaning of the statute and its application is also a matter of 
Page 10 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
{MW COO 178754.DOCX; 1/20397 .100} 
law over which this Court exercises free review. Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Ins. Fund, 134 
Idaho 130,134,997 P.2d 591, 595 (2000); JR. Simplot Co. v. Western Heritage Ins. Co., 132 
Idaho 582,584,977 P.2d 196, 198 (1999). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
This is a case of first impression in Idaho, the central issue being the proper rules to apply 
when engaging in a question of statutory interpretation and construction. Jadwiga asserts the 
District Court erred when it departed from Idaho's standard method of interpretation when it held 
LC. § 15-3-111 extends the creditor claim limitations period of LC. § 15-3-803 which reversed 
the Magistrate's holding. 
Under established Idaho law, courts faced with a question of statutory interpretation must 
first examine the literal words of the statute. A statute that is unambiguous should be construed 
by its plain and ordinary meaning. Where a statute is ambiguous, courts then look to the 
legislative history of the statute to aid in interpretation. If the intent of the legislature is unclear, 
then courts have occasion to consider additional rules of statutory construction. In failing to 
consider the plain language and legislative history of LC. § 15-3-111 the District Court erred in 
its analysis. Here, the plain language of LC.§ 15-3-111 is unambiguous and only extends the 
limitation period of LC.§ 15-3-108. Further, the legislative history of LC.§ 15-3-111 does not 
suggest a legislative intent to extend the creditor claim limitations period of LC.§ 15-3-803. 
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Lastly, under Idaho's additional rules of statutory construction, LC. § 15-3-803 is unaffected by 
the language of LC.§ 15-3-111. 
A. The District Court erred as a matter of law by construing the statutory language of 
I.C. § 15-3-111 against its plain and ordinary meaning. 
Idaho courts have stated that a court errs when it does not give statutory language its 
plain, obvious, and ordinary meaning. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654,659 978 P.2d 214,219 
(1999); see also Bonner County v. Cunningham, 156 Idaho 291,295,323 P.3d 1252, 1256 (Ct. 
App. 2014). Interpretation of a statute begins with its literal words. Bonner County, 156 Idaho at 
295. If a statute is unambiguous, a court should not construe it, merely follow the law as written. 
Bonner County, 156 Idaho at 295, 323 P.3d at 1256; see also Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889,895,265 P.3d 502, 508 (2011). 
In the present case, the "joint probate" statute known as LC.§ 15-3-111 is simply stated 
and its literal meaning clear. LC.§ 15-3-111 reads as follows: 
In cases in which a marital community has been dissolved by the 
death of either spouse at any time, the survivor was then entitled to 
all of the property of the decedent by will, law, or both, and the 
survivor died before any proceeding had been commenced for the 
probate of the estate of the spouse whose death occurred first, the 
estates of both decedents may be joined for probate in a single 
proceeding in any court having jurisdiction of the estate of the 
spouse whose death occurred last. The three (3) year provision of 
section 15-3-108 Idaho Code applies only to the death of the spouse 
whose death occurred last. The initial application or petition filed 
in any such joint proceeding shall contain a statement of the facts 
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upon which such joint proceeding is based, in addition to all other 
statements re_guired by this code to be made therein. 
LC.§ 15-3-111. 
The language of the statute is precise and should be construed by its literal words - no 
more, no less. Those words do not include an extension of the time for creditors to file claims 
against the first spouse who died. There is no reference to LC.§ 15-3-803 nor creditor claims in 
any portion of the language. As Judge Julian stated in his Memorandum Opinion: 
(R. 331). 
There is nothing in this section [LC. § 15-3-111] that states or 
suggests any tolling of a creditor's deadline to present a claim, just 
because the estate is subsequently jointly probated. Indeed, this 
section specifically exempts the three (3) year limitation on probate 
following death of the first spouse, as found in section 108. That fact 
clearly demonstrates the legislature's ability and willingness to make 
special exceptions within this particular provision where warranted 
and intended. As there is no exception made to the three (3) year 
creditors' bar found in 15-3-803, one shall not be implied by the 
court. Heinz's claim against Hedy's estate was not filed or 
"presented" within three years of her death and is now barred by IC 
§ 15-3-803(a)(l). 
The District Court, in its Opinion on Appeal, includes the above stated quote, but does 
not engage in its own analysis of the plain language of the statute or legislative history. (R. 331). 
Without finding the statue ambiguous, it construed the statute using additional rules of statutory 
construction. (R. 331-32). However, this Court has made clear that a court engages in statutory 
construction only where there is ambiguity. Bonner County, 156 Idaho at 295,323 P.3d at 1256. 
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Further, a finding of ambiguity requires more than presentation of conflicting interpretations. Id. 
"A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable 
construction." Id. "A statute is not ambiguous merely because an astute mind can devise more 
than one interpretation of it." Id. "If that were the test then all statutes whose meanings are 
contested in litigation could be considered ambiguous." Id. 
Despite this Court's clear guidance, the District Court did not apply well established rules 
of statutory construction and so erred in its interpretation of LC. § 15-3-111. Under Idaho law 
examination of the plain language of a statute precedes the application of additional rules of 
statutory construction. This Court noted that a court cannot deviate from existing law by 
applying rules of statutory construction without first examining the literal words of the statute 
and determining whether or not it is ambiguous. Bonner County, 156 Idaho at 295,323 P.3d at 
1256; see also In re Adoption of Doe, 156 Idaho 345, 349-50, 326 P.3d 347, 351-52 (2014). In 
that case, this Court found that the magistrate's application of a rule of statutory construction (in 
pari materia) was unnecessary and in error where the language in question was unambiguous. 
Id. at 351, 326 P.3d at 353. Further, this Court held that rules of statutory construction are 
inapplicable to unambiguous statutes, because "the clearly expressed intent of the legislative 
body must be given effect, and there is no occasion for a court to consider rules of statutory 
construction." Id. (citing Payette River Property Owner's Assn. v. Board. of Com 'rs. Of Valley 
County, 132 Idaho 551,557,979 P.2d 477,483 (1999)). 
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In the case at hand, the District Court erred by considering the effect of statutory 
construction rules without first analyzing the plain language of the statute for ambiguity. Under 
the holding of In re Adoption of Doe, the District Court's deviation from existing law is 
reversible error. 
B. The District Court erred by not considering legislative intent before construing I.C. 
§ 15-3-111 which does not indicate a legislative intent to extend the creditor claim 
limitation period. 
If this Court finds the words ofl.C. § 15-3-111 ambiguous, then it must look to the 
legislative intent, and in construing a statute, may examine the language used, the reasonableness 
of the proposed interpretations, and the policy behind the statute. Kelso & Irwin, P.A., at 134, 
997 P.2d at 595. "In attempting to discern and implement the intent of the legislature, the court 
may seek edification from the statute's legislative history and contemporaneous context at 
enactment." State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654,659, 978 P.2d 214,219 (1999). Extrinsic aids 
such as the statute's heading may be used to construe an ambiguous statute. State v. Moore, 111 
Idaho 854, 727 P.2d 1282 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986); see also Local 1494 of Intern. Ass'n of 
Firefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 99 Idaho 630,641,586 P.2d 1346, 1356-57 (1978). 
Previous to adopting the Uniform Probate Code (hereinafter "UPC") in 1971, Idaho's 
legislature had enacted I.C. § 15-313 in 1937 which provided for ajoinder of probates. I.C. § 
15-313 reads as follows: 
When a marital community is dissolved by the death of either 
member thereof, thereafter, if the survivor should die before 
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proceedings shall have been commenced for the probate of the estate 
of the person who first died, and both have died intestate the estates 
of both of the said decedents may, by order of the court, be joined 
for probate in a single proceeding in any probate court having 
jurisdiction of either estate; provided the same person is, under the 
provisions of section 15-312, entitled to letters of administration in 
both estates and consents so to act. The procedure to be followed 
shall be similar in all respects to that prescribed for the probate of 
the estate of the male member of a former marital community who 
has died intestate. 
LC.§ 15-313. Upon adoption of the UPC, LC.§ 15-313 was repealed leaving no method for 
joint probate until the enactment of LC.§ 15-3-111. 
LC.§ 15-3-111 was originally adopted in 1973 and the legislative purpose for adopting 
LC.§ 15-3-111 was to "fill certain gaps left out of the original probate code." S. B. 419, 1973 
Leg., 42nd Sess. (Idaho 1973) (Statement of Purpose). As before, this statute allows the estates of 
two deceased spouses to be joined for probate in a single proceeding in any court having 
jurisdiction of the estate of the spouse whose death occurred last. LC.§ 15-3-111. The original 
language of LC.§ 15-3-111 did not include reference to its effect upon surrounding statutes in 
the Idaho probate code. 
In 1995, LC.§ 15-3-111 was amended by Senate Bill No. 1166 to add: "[t]he three (3) 
year provision of section 15-3-108, Idaho Code, applies only to the death of the spouse whose 
death occurred last." The title of Senate Bill No. 1166 reads: 
An act relating to probate of wills and administration; amending 
section 15-3-111, Idaho Code, to clarify the application of a 
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provision of another statute [I.C. § 15-3-108] to the death of the 
spouse whose death occurs last. 
S. B. 1166, 1995 Leg., 53rd Sess. (Idaho 1995) ( emphasis added). 
The language of Senate Bill No. 1166 does not suggest a legislative intent to extend the 
time limitations in both I.C. §§ 15-3-108 and 15-3-803. First, the Senate Bill is written with 
reference to a singular, not plural, provision of "another" statute. Second, Idaho recognizes the 
rule of 17 expressio uni us est exclusion alterius, a Latin phrase meaning: "where a construction 
or statute specifies certain things, the designation of such things excludes all others. " Local 
1494 of Intern. Ass 'n of Firefighters, 99 Idaho at 639, 586 P.2d at 1355. Logically, if a statute 
specifies its effect upon a singular statute, the reference should be exclusive. There is no 
reference to creditor claims in the original statute or in its amendment. 
In its Memorandum Opinion, the District Court erred in its determination that the creditor 
claim period of I.C. § 15-3-803 of the first spouse to die was tolled when a joint probate was 
opened. The 1995 amendment to I.C. § 15-3-111 cannot be interpreted to include both the three 
(3) year provisions of LC.§§ 15-3-108 and 15-3-803 because there is no reference to LC.§ 15-3-
803 within the statute or its history. 
As an aside, LC.§ 15-3-111 cannot impliedly include both three year periods for the 
simple fact that it would have been impossible at the time of the amendment. In 1995, LC. § 15-
3-803 set forth a two year limitation upon the presentment of claims. LC.§ 15-3-803 (1991) 
( amended 2004 ). It was not until 2004 that a three year limitation period for creditor claims was 
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added to Idaho's Probate Code. Unless the legislature foresaw that the nonclaim statute would 
be extended to a three year limitation almost a decade later, it would be illogical to read LC. § 
15-3-111 to include the limitation period of LC. § 15-3-803. 
It is assumed this inconsistency, with regard to the two year limitation period, is one that 
the Idaho Legislature would have been aware of at the time of the 1995 amendment. Idaho has 
acknowledged the breadth of the legislature's knowledge of the law and consideration of the 
same: 
A statute is to be construed as a whole without separating one 
provision from another. The Court should also construe statues 
under the assumption that the legislature knew of all legal precedent 
and other statutes in existence at the time the statute was passed. 
State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654,659, 978 P.2d 214 (1999). 
The legislative history ofI.C. § 15-3-111, as a whole, does not support a contention that 
the Idaho Legislature intended to expand the limitation period for creditor claims in the context 
of a joint probate proceeding. 
C. The District Court improperly applied rules of statutory construction in construing 
I.C. § 15-3-111. 
In addition to the foregoing analysis, the Appellant requests this court consider how the 
meaning of LC. § 15-3-111 is developed under Idaho's additional cannons of construction. As a 
general rule, courts cannot insert into statutes terms or provisions which are not there. A court 
may, however, look to a number of factors which aid in construing an ambiguous statute. For 
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example, a court may favor a more specific statute over one that is more general, or where there 
are two statutes that conflict, but do not necessarily address the same subject matter, a court may 
look to the one enacted later in time. Finally, a court may construe an ambiguous statute in a 
manner that avoids absurd or harsh results. The issues discussed in this section involve whether 
the District Court correctly applied these cannons of construction when construing LC. § 15-3-
111. 
1. The District Court erred by allowing words to be added to I.C. § 15-3-111. 
The District Court erred by adopting Heinz's assertion, that joint probate revives a 
creditor's ability to enforce a claim that is otherwise foreclosed by the limitation period set forth 
in LC.§ 15-3-803. (R. 242, 332). As an initial matter, courts "cannot insert into statutes terms 
or provisions which are obviously not there." Matter of Adoption of Chaney, 126 Idaho 554, 
558, 887 P .2d 1061, 1065 ( 1995). It is well established in Idaho that courts should not second-
guess the wisdom of statutes or insert words the Court believes the legislature left out, be it 
intentionally or inadvertently. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. Gooding County, 159 
Idaho 84, 89,356 P.3d 377,382 (2015). For the legislative power is vested in the Senate and 
House of Representatives, rather than the courts. Id. 
Courts are not only divested of legislative power, but the Idaho Legislature can and has 
exercised its power to create other extensions or special exceptions to the creditor limitation 
period of LC.§ 15-3-803 and have done so regarding summary administration and in recovery 
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of certain assistance provided by Medicaid. These extensions or special exceptions will be 
discussed in more detail below. In these two instances, both of which are more recent than the 
1995 amendment to LC. § 15-3-111, the Idaho Legislature added words to the statutes which 
creates an extension or special exception for the time for creditors to file claims. In both 
circumstances, the extension or special exception is clear as it is expressly stated in the 
language of the statute. In contrast, the legislature chose not to add any such language to LC. § 
15-3-111 and the District Court improperly read an extension or special exception into the 
statute. 
The District Court's Opinion on Appeal, appears to adopt Heinz's position, that opening 
of a probate estate and appointment of a personal representative should trigger the time limit for 
submitting a claim. In its opinion, the District Court states first that "the three year limitation for 
creditors in LC.§ 15-3-803 (a)(l) parallels the general time limit for probating an estate." (R. 
329). It goes on to state that because the three year limit for probating an estate applies to the 
death of the spouse whose death occurred last, so then must the period for bringing a creditor 
claim. (R. 332). Such assertion ignores the plain language of LC.§ 15-3-803(a) which 
establishes a time limit for filing claims starting at the date of death. LC. § 15-3-803(a)(l). 





If the Legislature wished to create an extension or special exception in the context of 
joint probate, it easily could have done so. It did not. There are only two extensions or special 
exceptions to the time frames set forth in LC. § 15-3-803. In the first instance, a surviving 
spouse may use the summary administration process as provided under LC.§ 15-3-1205. 
The legislature amended LC.§ 15-3-108, effective July 1, 2014, to provide that the three 
year statute of limitations on probate proceedings does not apply to summary administration 
under LC. § 15-3-1205. In addition, LC. § 15-3-1205 expressly states that a surviving spouse 
must "assume and be liable for any and all indebtedness that might be a claim against the 
estate of the decedent and there will be no administration of the estate of the decedent." LC. 
§ 15-3-1205(c). With regard to summary administration, the Legislature specifically 
addressed claims against the estate. In 1995, the Legislature amended LC.§ 15-3-111, and 
did not create any extension or special exception to the filing of creditor claims when a joint 
probate was commenced. If the Legislature had wanted to toll the creditor claims for the first 
spouse who died, it could have easily made that amendment. It did not. 
Similarly, LC. § 56-218 was amended in 2006 to expressly provide an extension or 
special exception to the limitation period for Medicaid recovery claims. For many years, the 
statute provided that recovery could be made from the individual's estate, and the estate of the 
spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both, but there would be no adjustment or recovery 
until the death of the surviving spousr LC. §56-218 (2005). However, the Court in In re Estate 
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of Kaminsky held the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter "Department) was 
barred from recovery on their claim because the Department had not timely presented a claim 
against the estate pursuant to LC. § 15-3-803. In re Estate of Kaminsky, 141 Idaho 436, 438-39, 
111 P.3d 121, 123-24 (2005). In response to this holding, the Idaho legislature amended LC.§ 
56-218 to provide that no claim needed to be filed on the death of the first spouse, unless actual 
notice was given of the probate, or unless a joint probate were opened under LC. § 15-3-111. 
The reason for the change was given as follows: 
Section Two amends Idaho Code§ 56-218 to clarify the presentation 
and collection of estate recovery claims by Health & Welfare. A 
number of clarifications are made by repositioning language or 
stating the existing concept more clearly. Under existing law, if the 
institutionalized spouse, who received Medicaid, dies leaving a 
surviving spouse, no actual collection is made, but a "claim" must 
be sent to the personal representative of the estate of deceased 
institutionalized spouse, or if no probate is done, to the surviving 
spouse. This can be very frightening to the surviving spouse, who 
often does not understand that no current reimbursement is being 
demanded. Therefor[ e] [sic], the bill both clarifies that no recovery 
is made until both spouses are deceased and also removes the 
requirement to send a claim if no probate is filed at the first death. 
S. B. 1318, 2006 Leg., 53th Sess. (Idaho 2006). 
LC. § 56-218 was amended in 2006 to include a reference to LC. § 15-3-111 which 
provides for an expanded recovery for estate recovery claims for Health and Welfare with joint 
probates. LC. § 15-3-803 was not amended to allow expanded recovery for creditors when a 




legislative history and construing the former as inclusive of the latter runs afoul ofldaho's 
statutory construction rules. 
2. Marshall v. Department of Transportation and the statutory rule favoring 
specific statutes over general statutes was misapplied to the facts of this 
matter. 
The Court below relied upon Marshall v. Department of Transportation for the 
rule which states: "the more general statute should not be interpreted as encompassing an area 
already covered by one which is more specific." Marshall v. Department ofTransp., 137 Idaho 
337,341, 48 P.3d 666, 670 (Ct. App. 2002) (emphasis added). However, the rule requires that 
the two statutes address the same subject matter. State v. Betterton, 127 Idaho 562, 564, 903 
P.2d 151, 153 (Ct. App. 1995). 
The District Court misapplied this rule because the statutes at issue do not address the 
same subject matter. A more specific statute that does not address the same subject matter as a 
more general statute does not fall within the purview of the rule. Betterton, 127 Idaho at 564, 
903 P.2d at 153. LC.§ 15-3-803 sets limitations on presentation of claims. LC.§ 15-3-111 on 
its face does nothing to address the time frame for presenting a claim, but refers to the process of 
opening a probate in a certain instance. These two statutes do not address the same subject 
matter so the rule stated in Marshall does not apply. 
While the rule favoring specific statutes over general statutes may not apply under the 
facts of this case, a sister rule which appears hand-in-hand with it may be applicable under the 
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facts of this case. Regardless of whether the two statutes address the same subject matter, an 
inconsistency in their effect may still arise. When two statutes are irreconcilable, the rule is the 
one enacted later in time prevails. In re Estate of Wiggins, 155 Idaho 116, 123,306 P.3d 201, 
208 (2013) (citing Mickelsen v. City of Rexburg, 101 Idaho 305,307,612 P.2d 542,544 (1980)). 
It is undisputed that LC.§ 15-3-111 extends the general three year timeframe in which to 
file a probate action. Consequently, in cases such as this one, LC. § 15-3-111 is the specific 
statute, while LC. § 15-3-108 is a more general statute. These two statutes cover the same 
subject matter- the opening of a probate. Unlike, the interplay between those two statutes, LC. 
§§ 15-3-111 and 15-3-803(a)(l) do not cover the same subject matter. The analysis of whether 
LC.§ 15-3-111 is more specific becomes unnecessary. 
However, to the extent that LC.§§ 15-3-111 and 15-3-803 conflict, LC.§ 15-3-803 is the 
later enacted statute. LC.§ 15-3-111 was last amended in 1997 (to provide the three year 
limitation to open a probate only extended to the spouse who died last), whereas LC.§ 15-3-803 
was last amended seven years later in 2004 (to extend the statute oflimitations from two years to 
/ 
three years from date of death). If the legislature had wanted the provisions of LC.§ 15-3-803 to 
be tolled in the event a joint probate was commenced, it could have made that amendment. It did 
not. This Court should reverse the holding of the District Court and reaffirm the Magistrate 
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3. Enforcing the statutory creditor claim period in the context of joint probate 
does not produce an absurd result. 
As noted above, I.C. § 15-3-111 expressly provides that a joint probate can be 
commenced only when the martial community of a couple ended at the death of the first spouse, 
and the surviving spouse was entitled to all of the deceased spouse's property by will, law or 
both, and no probate had been commenced on the death of the deceased spouse. The reason this 
rule is needed is LC. § 15-3-108 only allows three years for the probate of a will in Idaho. After 
three years have elapsed, a probate cannot be opened. This statute specifically states that, 
although the probates can be combined, the three year rule to probate the Will only applies to the 
spouse who died last. 
In Idaho, it is common to find many instances wherein the first spouse dies and the 
surviving spouse does not open a probate. When all the assets are titled in joint names and the 
surviving spouse is not hindered in his or her ability to gain access or have control over the 
remaining assets, the surviving spouse may not view a probate as necessary. However, to 
transfer real property, a legal action must commence. 
Allowing the use ofl.C. § 15-3-111 saves time and judicial economy by probating both 
estates in one proceeding. This process is used almost exclusively to transfer real property, such 
as in this case. This comports with the goal of the UPC Idaho adopted in 1971. As stated by this 
Court "[t]his code shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes 
and policies." Subsection (b) states that, "[t]he underlying purposes and policies of this code are: 
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(1) to simplify and clarify the law concerning the affairs of decedents ... ; (3) to promote a 
speedy and efficient system for liquidating the estate of the decedent and making distribution to 
his successors. In Re Estate of Elliott, 141 Idaho 177, 181, 108 P.3d 324, 328 (2005). 
The District Court, in its Opinion on Appeal, found that LC. § 15-3-111, if applied under 
its plain meaning, would lead to an absurd or unreasonably harsh result. (R. 332). The 
Honorable Judge Stegner wrote, "If the statute oflimitations for the first to die is not tolled, then 
in effect the only estate to probate is that of the second to die." (R. 332). 
The issue of transferring real property may only arise after the death of the surviving 
spouse, making joint probate an economical decision. If a joint probate were not available, the 
heirs or devisees who are to receive real property would be forced to commence a quiet title 
action or seek determination of heirs in order to transfer the property from the first spouse to die. 
At the same time, the heirs or devisees would have to open probate as a second and separate 
proceeding to transfer the real property from the second spouse to die. The operation of a joint 
probate furthers the goal of the UPC to simplify the law and to promote a speedy and efficient 
system to transfer assets. A joint probate allows the estate of the second spouse to die to be 
probated and to finalize transfer of real property held in the name of the first spouse to die. 
4. A strict three year creditor claim period in the context of a joint probate does 
not lead to an unreasonably harsh result. 
Courts recognize that limiting the time for a creditor claim to bring is reasonable 




lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh results are disfavored." (R. 333) (citing State v. Yager, 139 
Idaho 680, 690, 85 P.3d 656, 666 (2004)). In Idaho, words of a statute should be given their 
plain meaning, unless a contrary legislative purpose is expressed or the plain meaning creates an 
absurd result. KGF Development, LLC v. City of Ketchum, 149 Idaho 524,528,236 P.3d 1284, 
1288 (2010). Yet, the Idaho Supreme Court has never "revised or voided an unambiguous 
statute on the ground that it is patently absurd or would produce absurd results when construed as 
written and [does not have] the authority to do so." Verska, 151 Idaho at 8~6, 265 P.3d at 509. 
Idaho Courts have recognized time and again the statute of limitations for creditors to file 
a claim runs from the date of death of the person who died. See In re Estate of Kaminsky, 141 
Idaho at 439, (a claim filed more than two years after date of death but within a year of opening 
probate is disallowed as not timely filed (citing LC. § 15-3-803 which provided a two year claim 
period)); Holt v. Mickelson, 41 Idaho 694,696,242 P. 977 (1925) (nonclaim statutes are short 
and highly penal, and should not be extended beyond the intent of the Legislature). 
Additionally, the Supreme Court of the United States in Tulsa v. Pope emphasized the 
importance of non claim statutes and their role in regulating the timeliness of claims. Tulsa v. 
Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1998). There the court noted that nonclaim statutes are almost universally 
included in state probate codes. Id. at 479. While the holding in Pope involved due process of 
notice to creditors in probate proceedings, that court, in dicta, also recognized a state's interest in 
the need for prompt administration of claims. The Supreme Court stated that "[d]eath transforms 
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the decedent's legal relationships and a State could reasonably conclude that swift settlement of 
estate is so important that it calls for very short time deadlines for filing claims." Id. at 489. 
Also, that the purpose and effect of nonclaim statutes is to regulate the timeliness of claims and 
forever bar untimely claims. Id. at 488. Thus, under Pope, a state's creation of short time 
limitation on bringing a claim is not absurd. 
After a review of other states who have adopted the UPC, Idaho is the only one that has 
adopted the unique language found in LC.§ 15-3-111. However, Utah has adopted Utah Code§ 
75-3-109 which reads as follows: 
(1) Upon petition by any person interested in two or more estates, 
the court may, after notice and hearing, grant letters upon these 
estates jointly if administration has not commenced with respect to 
any such estate and if: 
(a) All or any part of the estate of one decedent has 
descended from another decedent; or 
(b) Two or more decedents held any property during their 
lifetimes as tenants-in-common and if the persons entitled under the 
wills of these decedents or under the law of intestate succession to 
receive the estates of these decedents are the same. 
(2) Ifletters are granted upon two or more estates jointly under this 
section, these estates shall be administered the same as if they were 
but one estate except that claims may be enforced only against the 
estate to which they relate. 
Utah Code§ 75-3-109 
This is consistent with the Estate's argument set forth above. Accordingly, Idaho's UPC 
applies a maximum three-year limitations period on the presentment of creditor claims which 




the case of Medicaid recovery as noted above. This rule is also stated in the official comment to 
Uniform Probate Code§ 3-317 which states as follows: 
In succession without administration, there being no personal 
representative's notice to creditors, the short non-claim period under 
UPC Section 3-803(a)(l) does not apply and creditors are subject to 
the statutes of limitations and the limitation of three years on 
decedent's creditors when no notice is published under UPC Section 
3-803(a)(2). The general statutes oflimitation are suspended for four 
months following the decedent's death but resume thereafter under 
UPC Section 3-802. The assumption of liability by the universal 
successors upon the issuance of the Statement of Universal 
Succession is deemed to be by operation oflaw and does not operate 
to extend or renew any statute of limitations that had begun to run 
against the decedent. The result is that creditors are barred by 
the general statutes of limitation or 3 years whichever is the 
shorter. (Emphasis added). 
Unif Probate Code§ 3-317 (amended 2010) (Comment). 
I.C. § 15-3-111 provides a means of effectively passing property of joint estates and 
contains no tolling provisions on the presentment of creditor claims for the first spouse who died. 
Thus, the Idaho Code plainly limits the presentation of creditor claims against an estate to a 
maximum of three years after the decedent's death regardless of whether the surviving spouse's 
estate exercises the right to jointly probate the estates of both spouses. The Appellant urges this 
Court to find that I.C. § 15-3-111 does not enlarge the statute of limitations and reverse the 
District Court's decision. 
If this Court agrees with the ruling of the district court below, a practitioner would never 




several years prior. In this instance, Hedy died five years before Robert. If Hedy had died 
ten years or twenty years before Robert, the District Court's holding would allow Hedy's 
creditors to bring claims in Robert's estate by virtue of opening a joint probate under I.C. § 
15-3-111. This cannot be what the legislature intended. Tolling the statute of limitations 
just because a joint probate is commenced leads to an absurd result and runs afoul of the 
underlying purposes and policies of the UPC. 
5. Enforcing the creditor claim limitation period in the context of joint probate 
does not produce an absurd result, because a creditor can and must timely 
assert their claim. 
Enforcing the nonclaim period against a creditor, in the context of joint probate, is 
not absurd because a creditor may enforce a claim within the statutory period by opening 
probate. Idaho law protects creditors from having their claim foreclosed by the passage of time, 
by giving creditors the ability to open a probate if none were opened. A creditor can, at any time 
45 days after the death of decedent, open a probate as a creditor of the decedent's estate. I.C. § 
15-3-203(a)( 6). 
It is true that administration of an estate is necessary to enforce a claim and that no 
proceeding to enforce a claim against the estate of a decedent may be commenced before the 
appointment of a personal representative. I.C. § 15-3-104. However, a creditor is empowered to 




Not only may a creditor open probate in order to enforce his claim, he must exercise 
reasonable diligence in attempting to save his claim against the estate from the bar of a statute of 
limitations. Gwinn v. Melvin, 9 Idaho 202,210 72 P. 961,962 (1903). A creditor "cannot 
without good cause or reason defer making application [for probate] until the statute of 
limitations has run, and then successfully contend that said statute was suspended on account of 
the nonappointment of an administrator." Id. Under Idaho case law then, creditors are not 
prevented from enforcing their claim when a third party neglects to open probate and are instead 
required to open probate themselves in order to protect a claim. While this law predates the 
enactment of the joint probate statute, both Idaho courts and its legislature both required a 
creditor to enforce its claims long before the joint probate statute was enacted. The absurd result 
would be to reward a creditor who sits on his rights, only to be afforded a second chance at 
collection in the event joint probate is eventually opened. 
D. Jadwiga is entitled to her costs and attorney's fees pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)-(e)(2 
and J.C. 15-8-208. 
Jadwiga requests an award of her costs and attorney's fees on appeal based upon LR.C.P. 
54(d)-(e)(2). Under LR.C.P 54(d), costs are allowed as a matter ofright to prevailing parties 
unless otherwise ordered by the court. LR.C.P. 54 (d)(l)(A). Under LR.C.P 54(e), attorney fees 
may be awarded to a prevailing party when provided for by any statute or where allowed under 
LC. § 12-121. LR.C.P. 54(e)(l)-(2). Jadwiga requests a statutory award of her costs and 
attorney's fees on appeal based on LC. § 15-8-208. 
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The Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (hereinafter "TEDRA") governs all matters 
concerning the estates and assets of deceased persons. LC.§ 15-8-102(l)(a). Matters under this 
section include any question arising in the administration of an estate. LC. § 15-8-103(1 )( c ). 
Jadwiga timely disallowed the claim filed by Heinz and sought a determination the claim was 
barred by the statute oflimitations in Hedy's estate. This is a question regarding the 
administration of the estate and within the general powers given the courts in the TEDRA 
statutes. 
As part of TEDRA, LC. § 15-8-208 grants the court discretion to award costs, including 
reasonable attorney fees in proceedings involving decedent's estates. LC. § 15-8-208 reads as 
follows: 
"(1) Either the district court or the court on appeal may, in its discretion, order 
costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, to be awarded to any party: 
(a) From any party to the proceedings; 
(b) From the assets of the estate or trust involved in the proceedings; or 
(c) From any nonprobate asset that is the subject of the proceedings. The 
court may order the costs to be paid in such amount and in such manner as 
the court determines to be equitable. 
(2) This section applies to all proceedings governed by this chapter including, 
but not limited to, proceedings involving trusts, decedent's estates and 
properties, and guardianship matters. Except as provided in section 12-117, 
Idaho Code, this section shall not be construed as being limited by any other 
specific statutory provision providing for the payment of costs, unless such statute 
specifically provides otherwise." 
LC. § 15-8-208 ( emphasis added). 
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Heinz petitioned the court to allow his claim under LC. § 15-3-806. Heinz sought an 
order directing the personal representative to pay his claim. Payment of allowed claims is a 
matter concerning the estate and is a part of the administration of the estate. The appeal to the 
District Court and the appeal to this Court are a result of that petition. Because Heinz sought 
resolution of a dispute involving an estate matter governed by TEDRA, this court may apply 
TEDRA's attorney fee provision. This Court may, in its discretion, award Jadwiga's costs 
including reasonable attorney fees from Heinz. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Jadwiga respectfully requests that this Court hold that LC. § 
15-3-111 does not create an extension or special exception to the creditor claim period set forth 
in LC. § 15-3-803, reversing the District Court's ruling and affirming the ruling of the Magistrate 
Court. In addition, Jadwiga respectfully requests an award of costs and attorney's fees on 
appeal. 
DATED this [ff- day of April, 2017. 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC. 
By ~CJ.ut{d.e,t_ 
Mary W usack 
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